Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Meaning: Differs from the reference object (reference). The object does not have to exist for an expression to have a meaning. Words are not related to objects in a one-to-one correspondence. There is an important distinction between word meaning and sentence meaning. See also use theory, sentence meaning, reference, truth, meaning theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
E. Tugendhat on Meaning - Dictionary of Arguments
I 21 Meaning/Tugendhat ultimately not based on objects (not any more than on circumstances) but on truth conditions - later verification conditions. >Truth conditions, >Verification conditions, >Verification, >Circumstances/Tugendhat. I 263 Sentence: Meaning/Tugendhat by specifying its truth conditions - and explains this by demonstrating the way of verification. >Sentence meaning. I 282 Meaning/Tugendhat: the meaning of the sentence p is not the fact that p : that fails with sentences that contain deictic expressions. - Different situations have different truth conditions. >Situations, cf. >Situation semantics. I 283 Meaning/Tugendhat: of a sentence: function. Arguments: use-situations of the sentence. Values: the assertions (truth conditions). >Functions, >Use, >Use theory (only for words, not for sentences). I 432 Meaning/Tugendhat: function whose arguments are the speech situations and their values are the objects . "The meaning maps the speech situations on the items". Vs: that is metalinguistically - it requires understanding of " I " , "here", etc. first to understand - (because demontratives are not names). Substitutability is the meaning of demonstratives. >Understanding, cf. >Speaker meaning, >Substitution, >Demonstratives. - - - II 231 Meaning/Frege/Tugendhat: should not be translate as "reference". Only where Frege conceives sentences as a proper name. >Reference, >Fregean meaning, >Fregean sense, >Sense. Frege distinguishes between reference of names and truth values of sentences. >Truth values, >Sentences. II 240 Otherwise error/Frege: ... that you can mingle meaning and concept on the one hand and meaning and subject matter on the other hand. - Correct: "What two concept words ( predicates ) mean is the same iff the corresponding extents (value progression) coincide. >Value progression, >Term scope. II 247 Tugendhat: (meaning/reference): nevertheless there is a primacy of truth over the objects. >Truth/Tugendhat, >Truth. II 242 Meaning/Tugendhat: sentences are meaningful in that they can be true/false. - predicates by apply to some (and not others) objects. >True-of, >Satisfaction. Names: denote something. Predicates can be attributed to a thing. >Names, >Predication._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
||
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19