Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Meaning theory: a theory that seeks to explain the meaning of meaning. Problem the concept of meaning and truth seem to presuppose each other._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Brian Loar on Meaning Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
Avramides I 27 Meaning Theory/Loar: a meaning theory cannot be drawn as a purely extensional truth theory. >Extensionality, >Extensions. Problem: 1st The equivalence of "Snow is white" and "Grass is green" 2nd Hesperus is bright iff Phosphorus is bright, 3rd "Snow ist white and 2+ 2 = 4" is true iff snow is white. Solution/Fodor/Lepore :the right hand side must be a translation from the left. Cf. >Convention T. Meaning Theory/Avramides: Thesis: the problems disappear when it comes to the big picture: how sounds turn to speech acts? >Speech acts. Only then the truth conditions will come up, because the meaning theory must fit into a theory of power. Lewis: sounds have truth conditions only relative to a language. >Phonemes. Psychology comes into play only when it comes to favoring one language in a population. >Language community, >Conventions, >Language use. - - - Loar II 139f Meaning Theory/Loar: a) extensional (Quine, Davidson ) b) Loar: intensional: semantic concepts are located within a larger framework of propositional attitudes. Davidson: intermediate position. >Intensionality, >Propositional attitudes. II 141 Meaning Theory/Davidson: main problem: how to avoid: "Snow is white " is true iff grass is green. If one accepts this as extensionally right hand side (correct), then there is not more than that in the idea of the meaning. II 142 Meaning Theory/Loar: a list does not work: "x is camel1 , or camel2 ... ": there is no understanding of a sentence. Wrong solution: simplicity: "x is a camel " is only satisfied by y, if y is a camel. Vs: this solution is too strong and too vague. For someone who knows nothing of a language that meaning theory does not work that way. The Tarski schema " S is true ... " ( equivalence scheme) does not give the meaning. >Tarski scheme. We also need at least "an expression x is S and ... " Problem: we then have a metametalanguage. >Metalanguage. II 143 Solution/Loar: when entities were meanings they could distinguish sentence meaning from anything else what is true in the sentence. >Sentence meaning, >Meaning. II 149 Meaning Theory/Loar: Thesis: a meaning theory is a theory of mind, not vice versa._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 |
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> Counter arguments against Loar
> Counter arguments in relation to Meaning Theory
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19