Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Concept: a concept is a term for an entity with certain properties. The properties of an object correspond to the features of the concept. These concept features are necessary in contrast to the properties of an individual object, which are always contingent._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Gottlob Frege on Concepts - Dictionary of Arguments
II 29 Def Concept: a concept is a function whose value is always a truth value. Concept: a concept is not an object in itself, while the concept scope (value progression, i.e. with an inserted value for the variable) is an object. >Object, >Truth value, >Function. II 66 f Concept: a concept is predicative, unsaturated and not an object. The inclusion of an object in a concept is an irreversible relation. E.g. "The morning star is nothing but Venus" but not "Venus is nothing but the morning star." II 66 f An equation is reversible, a predication is irreversible (intension, false: "Venus is nothing but the morning star.") >Intension, >Identity. II 66 The "meaning" of a name is never a concept (predicate) but always only a subject. A concept is not an object. The "meaning" (reference): is an object. E.g. the concept horse is not a concept (but just an object). Similarly: E.g. "This rose is red" and we say: "The grammatical predicate" "is red" is part of the subject "this rose". Here, the words "The grammatical predicate" "is red" are not a grammatical predicate but a subject. This is difficult to grasp, the city of Berlin being a city and the volcano Vesuvius being a volcano. II 71 >Subject, >Predicate. Because of its predicative nature the concept cannot appear readily as a subject, but must be transformed into an object first, more precisely: it must be represented by an object. E.g. "The concept human is not empty." Here, the first three words are to be regarded as a proper name. Def Concept: Meaning of a predicate. ((s) QuineVs: >Predicates/Quine, >Properties/Quine, >Meaning/Quine). II 74 Number/Numbers/Concept/Object/Frege: Figures are statements about a concept. E.g. "There is at least one root of 4" is not about a specific number 2 but about a concept: the root of 4. On the contrary: e.g. "The concept root of 4 is fulfilled": the first 5 words form the name of an object. Something is being said about an object. Fulfillment/Frege/(s): fulfillment is not a property of a concept, but of an object. The fulfilled object is the concept. >Satisfaction. II 80 Object/Relation/Frege: Problem: with the words. "The relation of being included in an object": we mean no relation but an object - ((s) the words are the name of the relation, the relation is an object). I 82 Concept/Frege: E.g. "All whales are mammals" is about concepts - not a single animal can be shown. It is better than to speak of an "indefinite object" > number: not the objects but the concepts are the carriers of the number. IV 110 Concept/Frege: whether a term is contradictory must be shown through research. - - - Tugendhat I 195f Concept/Frege: "logical basic relationship": is the inclusion of an object in a concept", whether it is properly applied: is not a logical, but empirical question._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |