|Concept: term for an entity with certain properties. The properties of an object correspond to the features of the concept. These concept features are necessary in contrast to the properties of an individual object, which are always contingent._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Concepts/McDowell: are used in receptivity.
Concept/McDowell: something that lies beyond the reach of spontaneity of naming "a concept" and then calling the relationship "rational", is fraudulent labelling.
Concept/McDowell: we must not imagine the world to be "behind the outer border of the conceptual realm".
Otherwise Davidson would be right, of course, there would be nothing but purely causal effects of the world on us.
But there is no such border. We can say this now without becoming idealists because of it or disregarding the independence of reality.
Concept/McDowellVsEvans: the tendency to apply a concept does not come out of the blue: When someone makes a judgment, it is wrested from him by experience._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell,