Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
|Concept: term for an entity with certain properties. The properties of an object correspond to the features of the concept. These concept features are necessary in contrast to the properties of an individual object, which are always contingent._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Wilfrid Sellars on Concepts - Dictionary of Arguments
Concept/experience/Sellars: it is not true that we have the concept of something because we recognize that sort of thing. It is rather the reverse: the ability to recognize a type of something, presupposes that one already has the concept of this type. We cannot have the impression of a tree, if we do not have the concept of the tree.
>Appearance, >Observation, >Observation language, >Observation sentences, >Seeing, >Seeing-as.
Concept: A conceptual object will become what it is, only by the difference that was caused by its presence in at least some inferences. This is a familiar theme in contemporary philosophy. > Inferentialism/Brandom, inferential content/Brandom, inference/Brandom.
Field II 166
Term/Schiffer: a term is only the shadow of subsentential expressions.
>Subsententials._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994
Authors A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z