Dictionary of Arguments

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Conceptual scheme: language and assumed objects. - The content is provided by stimulus influences.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
I (c) 41/42
Third Dogma/Conceptual Scheme/DavidsonVsQuine: Scheme: language along with ontology and world theory - Contents: build exemplary firing of the neurons - (in Quine instead of sense data) - QuineVsDavidson: Separation is not intended, it only appears in Davidson's presentation like this - The concept of the uninterpretable content is necessary, however, to make conceptual relativism clear - conceptual relativism: the conceptual scheme is a human creation; it is arbitrary. - "Conceptual sovereignty".
I (c) 44
DavidsonVsQuine: there are no last data, therefore no subtraction.
I (e) 87ff
Conceptual Scheme/Separation Scheme/Content >relativism - "stream of experience" - "uninterpreted givenness" - conceptual relativism.
- - -
I (e) 96
Scheme/Contents: have come into play as a pair, (Cl. Lewis) now we can let them drop out as pair - then no objects remain, in terms of which the question of representation could be raised - beliefs are true or false, but they represent nothing.
I (e) 98
Third Dogma/Scheme/Content/Error/Deception/Davidson: Deception is no longer a problem after the abolition of the separation scheme/content, no matter whether we are capable of knowing the world and other minds. - All the more: how - but these are no epistemological questions anymore now, but questions of the nature of rationality.
- - -
Glüer II 133
Incommensuralibilty presumes the separation scheme/content (Third Dogma).


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-04-25
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