. David K. Lewis on Assertibility - Dictionary of Arguments

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Assertibility: in certain circumstances or in a historical situation the possibility to make a statement when the linguistic means are given.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

David K. Lewis on Assertibility - Dictionary of Arguments

V 139
Assertibility/conditional/semantics/: we assume assertibility instead of truth because of the probability. However, assertibility is best gained through truth conditions plus a sincerity condition. Adams: the other way around: there are truth conditions not for the entire conditional, but individually for antecedent and consequent "plus a rule that assertibility of the indicative conditional is possible with the conditional subjective probability of the consequent given by the antecedent. Lewis pro (>Adams Conditional
). LewisVsAdams: means something different: he calls this "indicative conditional" what Lewis calls a "probability conditional". Adams: the probability of conditionals is not equal to the probability of truth. AdamsVsLewis: probability of conditionals does not obey the standard laws of probability. Solution/Lewis: if we do not mention truth, probability of conditionals obeys the standard laws. Then the indicative conditional has no truth value and no truth conditions, i.e. Boolean connections, but no truth-functional ones (not Truth Functional).
V 142
Assertibility/conditional/Lewis: assertibility should correspond to the subjective probability (Lewis pro Grice). The assertibility is reduced by falsehood or trivial being-true. This leads to conditional probability. From this we have to deduct the measured assertibility from the probability of the truth of the truth-functional conditional (horseshoe, ⊃).

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-05-24