Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Observation sentence also protocol sentence or basis sentence: Description of a sensually perceived event. Observation sentences are not irreversible and not independent of theories because of the vocabulary used in them.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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W.V.O. Quine on Observation Sentences - Dictionary of Arguments

II 43
Categorical observation sentences: are independent of time and space "Where there’s smoke, there’s fire" - are learned through language learning - knowledge still needs space/time - but they are theoretical terms - Truth of categorical observation sentences not by observation - But falsification (> Falsification/Popper).
II 43~
Empirical content = categorical observation sentences: are linking theory and observation - two theories are equivalent if all categorical sentences are identical - theory implies categorical sentences without being implied by them - a theoretical term does not appear in categorical sentence.
II 218f
Observation sentences are not about the experience! ((s) but about language, learning, situation, circumstances) - Quine: but they are fairly analog to the experience - single observation sentences are quite independent of each other.
VI 6
Observation sentence/compound/Quine: complex observation sentence is not merely a conjunction "There is blue" and "There is a pebble" - but "This pebble is blue".
VI 9
Sentences enter the link with stimulus leeway as a whole - N.B.: in this case they do not contain words, but only syllables! ((s)> Language learning, conditioning).
VI 10
Observation sentence/weight of theory/Quine: learned in connection with the stimulus situation, the sentence is free of theory - but considered word by word it contains theory.
>Stimulus/Quine.
VI 11/12
Language learning/observation sentence/ontology/Quine: we assume full sentences - if we had assumed single words, we would have ignored the problem of ontology and would already have assumed objects.
>Sentences/Quine.
VI 12f
Categorical observation sentence/Quine: brings hypothesis: "As soon as this, then that".
VI 13
But no reification of points in time.
VI 15
Circumstances: should be accompanying constantly - this makes pronouns and anaphora necessary - but not observation conditional: this is gained from un-timed (timeless) sentences using the theory.
VI 59ff
Observation sentence/Quine: new: no longer intersubjective agreement as a criterion.
VI 61
But fluidity of communication - and efficiency of practical contact - therein lies the "factualness".
XII 101
Definition observation sentence/naturalized epistemology/Quine: the sentences that are causally closest to the receptors - problem: "how to eliminate superfluous information?"
XII 102
Better: sentence which is insensitive within a community when it comes to differences in past experiences.
XII 103
In larger communities, the number of recognized object languages drops.
>Object Language/Quine.
XII 105
Decide: identity of the leeway of stimuli - ((s) Set of possible deviations must be the same for all members.)


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-08-03
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