Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Consciousness, philosophy: consciousness ist the experience of differences along with a knowledge about alternatives as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also Intentionality, Identity theory, Other minds, Self-consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Colin McGinn on Consciousness - Dictionary of Arguments
I 49 Consciousness/mind-body problem/McGinn: there seem to be no properties of physical organisms from which consciousness could arise under certain circumstances. Now, it is also difficult to specify exactly which property of consciousness ensures that it refuses a physical explanation. I 52 Consciousness/McGinn: Problem: what is the real hallmark of a state of consciousness? Where is the problem located? "What is it like to be a K?" I 56 Consciousness/McGinn: Problem: how is it possible that states whose condition is associated with "being-like" emerge from states where there is no "being-like"? Cf. >"What is it like to be a bat?", >Knowing how, >Experience. I 68 Consciousness/McGinnVsSearle: states of consciousness do not allow emergence-theoretical explanations with mereological terms. We are unable to reduce pain to the underlying neural units. On the contrary to that it is quite possible to explain the higher-level properties of liquids in this way. (s) because all levels are easily accessible to us. States of consciousness can therefore not be explored according to Combinatorial Atomism with lawlike mappings. We can well understand higher-level brain functions from their constituents, but if we start with consciousness, this explanation fails. >Explanation. I 74 Mind/brain/meaning/reference/McGinn: so according to this view, there is no referent that would ever raise a philosophical problem of its own, because the objective world is not a problem from a philosophical point of view. Philosophical problems arise from the meanings in the light of which we understand the world. It is not the soul as a referent to which the mystery clings. >Philosophy. Consciousness/McGinn: is theoretically unfathomable, because we do not understand what kind of relationship would be capable of linking experience with the world in a way that is given by our imagination when we talk about knowledge. I 192 What does it really mean for my mind to put itself in the position of the world? Since we receive no response, there is the notion that our cognitive powers are directed entirely inwards. However, this retreat is a deception according to transcendental naturalism. >Terminology/McGinn. - - - II 68 If the only thing on which we had relied was brain research, we would never even have got the idea that the brain houses a consciousness at all. I 86ff Knowledge/awareness/McGinn: even complete knowledge of ourselves would not let us look better in terms of consciousness. >Awareness/Chalmers. II 216 Consciousness is not a property that depends on its origin. >Artificial consciousness._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
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> Counter arguments against McGinn
> Counter arguments in relation to Consciousness
