Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Consciousness, philosophy: consciousness ist the experience of differences along with a knowledge about alternatives as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also Intentionality, Identity theory, Other minds, Self-consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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P.F. Strawson on Consciousness - Dictionary of Arguments
I 114 Consciousness/Strawson: why do we attribute it to a subject at all? - Why do we always atribute our experiences to the same subject? Descartes: body plays a unique role for everyone. Cf. >Apperception/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant. I 115 Strawson: face experiences depend on three things: 1) whether eyes opened, 2) where directed, 3) position of the body E.g. subject with three bodies: whether eyelids of A and B open irrelevant for whether C can see something. I 119 Possession of my body does not explain my concept of a self. >Body, >Self. I 120f Consciousness/Strawson: Descartes/Wittgenstein: both: attribution to body is a linguistic deception. 1) Descartes: "Person" refers to two very different substances, with types of states which are mutually exclusive. >Descartes, >Person. 2) Wittgenstein: "It thinks". (Strawson: ditto) >Consciousness/Wittgenstein, >Thinking/Wittgenstein. I 127 Consciousness/Self/I/Strawson: attributing states of consciousness and experiences to ourselves is a necessary condition for attributing them also to others. >Intersubjectivity, >Recognition, >Other minds >Community. Basis: notion of a class of predicates which require distinct individuals to whom they can be attributed. >Predicates/Strawson. I 129 Other individuals must be identified +through body, not merely as carriers of consciousness. - But this is not a simple refutation of Descartes, because s already presupposes that I have found a simple relation between my experiences and body M, which I'm still looking for. I 147 Consciousness/Strawson: pointless to speak of a single consciousness. I 171 Consciousness/Strawson: only possible as a secondary, non-basic particular. >Particulars/Strawson._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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> Counter arguments against Strawson
> Counter arguments in relation to Consciousness
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20