Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Cartesianism: (goes back to René Descartes) the thesis that we must distinguish between extended entities (bodies, matter, res extensa) and unextended entities (spirit, soul). See also Dualism.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Anita Avramides on Cartesianism - Dictionary of Arguments

I 107 ff
Cartesianism/Asymmetry/Avramidis: older tradition of deep epistemic asymmetry - mental objects only accessible through first-person perspective - other minds only guessable through behavior - then there is no superficial epistemic asymmetry - Important argument: ontological symmetry: mental and material on the same level - not obliged to physicalism - variant of Cartesianism: might even say the God standpoint could not recognize the intangible substance - deep epistemic asymmetry: if we could recognize the intangible substance, we could recognize foreign intentions without language. Cartesianism/Avramides: here: variant with divine access to the intangible

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2022-01-25
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