Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Chance: Chance refers to the possibility of an event occurring, often expressed as a probability. - Likelihood pertains to the probability of a specific outcome given certain conditions, indicating the plausibility of that outcome within a given context. Also see Likelihood, Probability._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D. Lewis on Chance - Dictionary of Arguments
V 65 Chance/Probability/Counterfactual Conditionals/Co.co./Possible Worlds/Po.wo./Lewis: It is legitimate to mention chances in the antecedent of the counterfactual conditional - because probabilities are an objective property of the world - then you can say that there is a certain chance for C, even though this chance is unfulfilled - this is a counterexample to the alleged incompatibility - Conclusion: we should say that there would have been a tiny chance for convergence (that the possible worlds looked like the real world), even if Nixon had pressed the button. >Probability/Lewis, >Probability conditional/Lewis, >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis, >Possible world/Lewis. V 91 Chance/Lewis: a) in relation to time: E.g. in a labyrinth: it depends on the location how long we still need b) timeless: E.g. radioactive decay. "Endpoint chance": time not mentioned - chance depends on possible worlds (where one stands inside the labyrinth). Chance: function of three arguments: Proposition, time, world. V 98 Definition chance/Jeffrey: (R. Jeffrey 1965(1)): is an objectified subjective probability. V 99 Definition objectification: (in terms of a partition of a given world): the probability distribution obtained from a belief function by conditionalising (forming the conditional) through the element of the partition - objectified belief: the belief conditional on the truth - (only so much truth as is covered by the element) - which element is valid, is contingent and does not depend on what we think - an element: is the equivalence class of worlds in terms of equality of facts until before t and the dependency of the opportunities on the prehistory - ((s) I.e. in all possible worlds in which this prehistory is true ... will be. V 130 Chance/Acceptable information/Lewis: problem: under the current analysis information about current opportunities is a disguised form of unacceptable information about future history. 1. Richard Jeffrey [1965]: The Logic of Decision. New York: McGraw-Hill_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19