Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Definition: determination of the use of linguistic signs (words, symbols, connectives) for non-linguistic or linguistic objects. New definitions are not supposed to be creative, that is, they are to be derived from the use of the signs already employed. See also definability, conservativity, systems, theories, models, reference systems, context definition, explicit defnition, implicit definition._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Ludwig Wittgenstein on Definitions - Dictionary of Arguments
Hintikka I 228 Sense Data/Ostension/Definition/Learning/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: pointing out, the legacy of the Tractatus "Showing", can certainly serve as the only method for defining sense data. But as soon as inaccessible objects (atoms) are added, it is no longer sufficient. Showing/WittgensteinVsShowing/Ostension/Hintikka: Problem: e.g. how to show the state of California? (>Definition, >indicative definition.) Even if Wittgenstein claims on the first page of the Blue Book that all non-verbal definitions are indicative definitions, he immediately limits this: I 229 "Does the indicative definition itself need to be understood?" >Understanding. The listener must probably already know the logical status of the defined entity. For example, it is not possible to point out a non-existent object, even if you are telephoning someone who sees it. The same applies to other people's immediate experiences. And if one thinks that even the words "there" and "this" for their part are to be introduced by an indicative explanation, then this indicative indication must be quite different from the usual indicative explanation. (PI §§ 9,38). >Explanation. I 329 Color/Definition/Reference/Wittgenstein:...Now we can understand what Wittgenstein means when he says: ""red" means the color that comes to my mind when I hear the word "red"" would be a definition. No explanation of the nature of the denotation by a word. This point loses its essence if "denotation" is understood here in the sense of "name". Even a completely successful definition does not indicate what it means that the definition refers directly - i.e. without language play - to its subject. - - - II 44/45 Ostensive Definition/Wittgenstein: it just adds something to the symbolism - it does not lead beyond the symbolism - a set of symbols is replaced by another. The explanation of the meaning of symbols is given in turn, via symbols. >Symbols. II 73 Definition/Wittgenstein: a definition is nothing more than an indication of a relevant rule - (s) context: e.g. negation.) >Negation. II 116 Calculating/Wittgenstein: the tables of multiplication are definitions._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
||
> Counter arguments against Wittgenstein
> Counter arguments in relation to Definitions
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-23