Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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de re, philosophy: statements that refer to non-linguistic objects are de re. Here, most authors assume that the ascribed properties are contingent. An exception is essentialism which ascribes certain necessary properties to objects. See also de dicto, necessity de re, contingency, modality, essentialism.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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Roderick Chisholm on de re - Dictionary of Arguments

I 30f
Meaning De Re/Chisholm: attributing another thing the property: you're meant by me as happy - Others Vs: such property does not exist, the spirit cannot leave the circle of his ideas.
I 36
E.g. Mach: de re with respect to himself: "what a shabby school master..." - but not de dicto: "I am a...".
I 37
De Dicto: the greatest man accepts the proposition that the greatest man is wise - De Re: there is an x ​​such that x is the same as the greatest man, and x is considered to be wise by x
I 38
(P) The greatest man accepts the proposition that the greatest man is wise. (de dicto) -
(Q) There is an x ​​such that x is the same as the greatest man, and x is considered to be wise by x. (de re) - (s) The greatest man thinks himself that he is wise - See below: (S"), (P"): direct attribution instead of de re and de dicto
I 39
"He Himself"/Chisholm: implies the expression de re, unlike the term de dicto.
- - -

II 121
Belief De Re/Chisholm: a) due to the accepted proposition that X has the property F - b) strict form: further proposition knows that the object is the only one to possess the further property C - ("epistemic proximity").
II 122
But that does not help much, because this can still be a knowledge by description - that is the problem of intentionality - "epistemically closer relationship" still not found.


Brandl, Johannes. Gegen den Primat des Intentionalen. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-06-17
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