Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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de re, philosophy: statements that refer to non-linguistic objects are de re. Here, most authors assume that the ascribed properties are contingent. An exception is essentialism which ascribes certain necessary properties to objects. See also de dicto, necessity de re, contingency, modality, essentialism.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

David K. Lewis on de re - Dictionary of Arguments

IV 49
De re (de dicto/possible world/Lewis: de re: language of our world, events in possible worlds. - de dicto: language from possible world (completely different meaning possible), events in possible world.
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IV 54
De re/Possible world/Lewis: first the denoted thing is identified in the actual real world and then the counterparts are found in the possible world - we do not even look at things that are denoted by subject terms in other possible worlds - de dicto: here we look at things that are designated by subject terms in other possible worlds.
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V 19
De re/Counterfactual conditional/Lewis: E.g. "If Caesar had not crossed the Rubicon, he would never have been the Emperor" - is de re about - "the Emperor" - otherwise wrong: the Emperor would not have been the Emperor - right: "If x hadn’t …, x would not ..." - with that we are referring to the actual Emperor - Important argument: then we could also quantify through counterfactual conditionals (quantification via Counterfactual Conditional): "Every Emperor, who would not have been one, if he had not crossed the Rubicon, will wish in the end that he had crossed the Rubicon" - likewise: E.g. "every match ..." - logical form:
were A(x)>> would C(x). Cf. >counterfactual conditionals/Lewis.

Potentiality/Lewis: what is it then?


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-21
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