Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Determinism, philosophy: the idea that events and mental states occur due to strict laws and are therefore determined in advance. For a prediction one only has to know the environmental conditions. The fact that we do not know if determinism is true is sometimes explained by our incomplete knowledge of the environment. See also indeterminism, strict laws, prediction, probability, probabilism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David K. Lewis on Determinism - Dictionary of Arguments
V 37 Determinism/Lewis: it is not certain that our world is indeterministic. - More certain is asymmetry - this could also come about under deterministic conditions. >Asymmetry. V 45 Determinism/Possible worlds/Lewis: It is wrong to say that two deterministic possible worlds would differ only slightly from each other - they can diverge just as quickly as indeterministic ones - there are many probablities for small differences which become then large. V 58 Indeterminism/Lewis: should not be derived from the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. - This is a frivolity - to anthropocentric. - Instead: obviously also in radioactive decay processes. - But this also allows possible world/asymmetry: more simple: now we do not need anymore small wonders to justify deviations - convergence: here, the problem remains the same. - ((s) It is difficult to justify with and without determinism.) - Variant: perfect convergence: is difficult to explain with the indeterminism. >Possible world/Lewis. V 120 LewisVsDeterminismus: what is it then supposed to mean that a coin is fair? V 162 Determinism/Causing/Causality/Lewis: here: not universal causation, but - here pro: in the sense that there are not two possible worlds which are exactly equal up to a point in time and then differ without violating the laws. Indeterminism/Lewis: not Vs, but problem: the >counterfactual conditional analysis will not cover all cases._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Determinism
