Roderick Chisholm on Objects (Material Things) - Dictionary of Arguments
Res/Aquinas/Duns Scotus: "thing", transcendental, convertible with the beings (ens) - Brentano: Reism (late): abstractions, universals, negations, facts, forms, fictions: are not things.
Hedwig, Klaus. Brentano und Kopernikus. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986
Simons I 2
Chisholm: Thesis: (appearing) things (appearances) are logical constructions of objects for which the mereological essentialism applies. - Flux: Problem: changing objects cannot be regarded as identical with themselves according to the extensional mereology - Solution/Chisholm: thesis the actual are mereologically constant and the phenomena again logical constructions from immutable objects - VsChisholm: other solution: processes (with temporal parts ) instead of objects (continuants).
Simons I 120
Object/Thing/Object/Chisholm: Thesis: "Mereological constancy": objects in the original sense: - entia per se: cannot change - in the derived sense: entia per alio: subject to the flux, but only by being consulted successively through different entia per se, which differ in their parts._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987