Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Objects (materal things): Material things are objects that exist in the physical world. They are made up of matter and have spatial and temporal properties. Material things are often contrasted with immaterial things, such as minds and spirits. See also Space, Space time, Matter, Individuation, Identification, Reference, Singular terms, General terms._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Peter F. Strawson on Objects (Material Things) - Dictionary of Arguments
I 177f Thing/Job/language/Strawson: 1. grammatical criterion: List 1: Language functions: Differences: A-expressions/B-expressions: refer/describe, designate/to state something about him, etc. I 178 List 2: Differentiation of linguistic components: singular term/predicative term, referring term/predicate term, subject/predicate, etc. I 180 List 3: Distinguishes between constituents of statements or between things: things, to which one refers/predicted thing, etc.... nothing can occur on both sides: the act of self-relating cannot be identical with the act of predicting, but some possible in both roles) list 3 presupposes distinction thing/role. I 182 List 4: (corresponds to Frege): Object/term: combines roll and thing - no object can ever be predicted. >Object/Frege, >Concept/Frege. List 3: aligns the terms of List 2 (cf. >Particularisation/Ramsey). I 185 Thing/activity/"about"/represent/singular Term/predicate/StrawsonVsGeach: "about" cannot be used to distinguish between singular term and predicate. >Predication/Geach, >Predicate/Geach, >Singular Terms, >Predicates, >Intentionality, >Levels/Order. E.g. "Raleigh smokes" can be seen as a statement about smoking - also "stands for" specifies no singular term. Both singular term and predicative term can stand for something. VsGeach: he is compelled to say that "smokes" stands for something, because predicative expressions stand for properties according to him. >Properties/Geach. Terminology/Strawson: A-expressions: are substantive B-expressions: are predicative. I 203 Thing/property/singular Term/predicate/is/Strawson: if "Socrates is ..." with a description by "is" in the sense of "is identical to" is connected. Then "Socrates is ..." can be understood as B-expression (predicate). >equal sign instead of copula. >"Is". Problem: what things should be introduced by "is a philosopher"? >Introduction/Strawson. I 207ff Thing/predicate/singular term/introducing/Strawson: the reason for the distinction between A (Noun-) and B-expressions (predicate) is distinguishing between different things: between particular and universal, not between object and term or singular term and predicate. I 210 StrawsonVsTradition: already presupposes the distinction - external reason: might the tense function be the verb - Vs: this could also be expressed with two nouns and arrow notation. Socrates (Wisdom), then arrow either above Socrates or Wisdom, depending on whether Socrates died or became stupid. >Predication, >Ascription._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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> Counter arguments against Strawson
> Counter arguments in relation to Objects (Material Things)
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-24