Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Disposition, philosophy: the tendency for a certain behavior that is not yet occurred at the present time. Problem Statements containing dispositional terms, cannot be determined in their truth value, as the relevant event has not yet occurred. In classic logic can even be concluded that a sentence containing a dispositional term will be trivially true as long as the relevant circumstances are not realized. See also dispositional terms, counterfactual conditionals, law statements._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D.M. Armstrong on Dispositions - Dictionary of Arguments
II 1 f Disposition/Armstrong: Problem of unobservability. - - - Place III 113 Verification/Place: Verification of dispositional properties: this is about what is likely to happen, not about what is observable. - - - Armstrong II 4f Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Mellor: also categorical (not only dispositional) properties fulfil counterfactual conditionals. Armstrong: Dispositions are not made true by counterfactual conditionals. >Truthmaker/Armstrong. Martin: a counterfactual conditional can also be true, while a linked property is not realized - Dispositions cannot be reduced to the facts that are determined by the counterfactual conditionals which often contain them. II 5 Armstrong: Thesis: Dispositional = categorical properties = microstructure (therefore dispositions are no possibilia). - Other authors: categorical properties "realize" dispositional properties. >Microstructure/Armstrong. II 6 Dispositions/Martin: just as actual - it would be perverse to call them non-actual. Dispositions/Armstrong: dispositions are not in themselves causes - (others dito). - Dispositions are always actual, just not their manifestations. II 6 Example wire/Martin: Problem: a counterfactual conditional can be true without being true by virtue of the prescribed disposition: when the wire contacts, a current flows: can also be true if the wire is dead: e.g., "electro-finch": brings the wire to life the same moment: ((s) This would be a wrong cause). - - - Place II 62 Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsArmstrong: Genes are not the propensity (tendency) to disease, the propensity is explained by the genes (categorical property), therefore they cannot be identical with the dispositional properties. - - - II (c) 90 Dispositions/Armstrong/Place/Martin: Dispositions are "in" the objects. Martin: E.g. remote elementary particles which never interact with our elementary particles. - > This would require irreducible dispositions. ArmstrongVsMartin: there are no irreducible dispositions. Armstrong: why suppose that particles have properties in addition to have the manifested purely categorical property? II (c) 90/91 Martin-Example: Conclusion/Martin: Thesis: II 92 but the non-disp properties plus "strong" laws of nature which connect these non-disp properties are sufficient true makers - no unknown way of interaction is necessary. II 93 Armstrong: certain counterfactual conditionals apply, but their consequent must remain indeterminate, not only epistemically but also ontologically. >Counterfactual conditionals/Armstrong. II (c) 94 Intentionality/Armstrong: Vs Parallel to dispositions: in the mental, the pointing is intrinsic, in the case of dispositions it is only projected. - - - Place III 108 Dispositions/Martin: Solution: we have to assume particles without structure. Place III 109 Martin-Example/Place: his example with distant particles which themselves have no microstructure allows him to investigate the subtleties of the relation of the properties of the whole and the properties of the parts, but forbids him to examine the relations between categorical and dispositional properties. Place III 119 Purely dispositional properties/PlaceVsMartin: have a structural basis in the carrier, the two are separate entities in a causal relation. Parts/wholesPlace: are separate entities, they are suitable as partners in a causal relation. - Dispositional properties of the whole are an effect of the dispositional properties of the parts and their arrangement. - - - Martin III 163 Dispositions/Place: Dispositions are outside the entities, they are properties of interaction. (MartinVsPlace: This brings a confusion with manifestation. Armstrong: Should the dispositions be within? No. Rather in the connection. - Martin: they can be reciprocal reaction partners. Dispositions/Ryle: are not localized, but belong to the person or object. Martin III 165 Dispositions/MartinVsPlace: Place's introduction of "causal interaction" between the dispositions is a doubling of causality. Martin III 166 Dispositions/Martin: dispositions are always completely actual, even without manifestation. II 174 Armstrong: Dispositions are not in the eye of the beholder - unlike abilities._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
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> Counter arguments against Armstrong
> Counter arguments in relation to Dispositions
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19