Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Quine, Two Dogmas of Empricism:
1st Dogma distinction analytic/synthetic - 2nd Dogma reductionism. The belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to a logical construction of terms which refer to immediate experience. - Quine, W.V.O. (1951), "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," The Philosophical Review 60, 20–43. Reprinted in his 1953 From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press. See also analytic/synthetic, reduction, reductionism, conceptual schemes, holism. Later D. Davidson discussed a 3rd dogma (separation scheme/content).


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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
I 138
Meaning/Quine: gives in "Two Dogmas" a completely individualistic representation of language as an articulated network of sentences, i.e. the language in question could only be understood as the idiolect of a single speaker.
According to this representation, there is a function at any time that assigns the truth values to the records.
I 139
Quine has committed himself to the thesis that there is no way to distinguish between meaning and accepted theory.
After the publication of "Word and Object", Quine has tended to return to the view of "Two Dogmas", according to which the concept of the idiolect takes precedence. The assumption that the meanings that the speaker associates with his words are the same as they possess in the Community language cannot be maintained, according to the late Quine.
> Idiolect (>Two Dogmas) > Davidson: radical interpretation; idiolect of a certain time and situation.
- - -
II 115f
Sense/Two Dogmas/Dummett: the meaning of many sentences is such that we need inferences for their verification.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-03-29
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