|Property: what can be ascribed to an object in order to distinguish it from other objects. In philosophy, there is debate about whether properties exist or whether "bare particulars" exist. Expressions for properties are predicates. Not every predicate will refer to a property. See also quantification over properties, 2nd order logic, HOL, completeness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Roderick Chisholm on Properties - Dictionary of Arguments
Properties/Chhisholm: Problem: E.g. ""french" is not applicable to itself": here one cannot say that it has the property, not to itself ... otherwise paradox - solution: "... has not the property ... "- not every predicate is a property - so not every sentence expresses a proposition.
Properties/Chisholm: no conjunctions: E.g. "wise and bigger than this man" is not a property - "living opposite" is not a property.
Properties/Chisholm: "greater than" no property, not even "greater than z", etc. - no predicative expression containing free variables has a property as meaning.
Properties/Chisholm: is not a conjunctive property: E.g. e(thinking and (non-thinking or thinking) would not be a conjunctive property of the partial properties of e(thinking) - Involving: a involves b iff b is a partial property of a.
Synthetic apriori/SauerVsChisholm: from the standpoint of property inclusion, there seems to be no synthetic apriori - under the one of property existence no analytic apriori - since aprioricity implies necessity, because the equivalence between necessity and existence exists in all possible worlds, there can be no Chisholm-apriori.
Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986
Frank I 362
Properties/Chisholm: the non-comparative form is basic: one thinks that something is red before one thinks two things are the same red.
Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference,
and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55
James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An
International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians,
Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994