|Property: what can be ascribed to an object in order to distinguish it from other objects. In philosophy, there is debate about whether properties exist or whether "bare particulars" exist. Expressions for properties are predicates. Not every predicate will refer to a property. See also quantification over properties, 2nd order logic, HOL, completeness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Saul A. Kripke on Properties - Dictionary of Arguments
Ryle: the description decides whether a property is necessary or contingent! (Kripke: but not all properties are accidental, some are essential.)
Nature/Kripke: some properties are essential: e.g. 9 is an odd number.
Definition essential property: if we consider a property to be essential to an object, we usually mean that it would have applied to an object in any case in which it would have existed.
The relevance of properties depends on theory (Vs sheaf theory)
The biblical story does not provide any necessary properties of Moses, so he could have lived without accomplishing any of these things.
Properties: "essential" properties are perhaps not the most important property. No theory distinguishes by relevance.
I do not want to say that only the origin and substance are essential.
Properties: there could even be a substance that has all the identifying properties, and yet is not gold, e.g. fool’s gold.
Each property could turn out to be wrong, therefore it is not a bundle concept.
General names like "cat" do not express any property.
Kripke essential property/meaning/intention e.g. novel: it is not important whether the hero really was the Messiah, but it is important that the deeds apply to the intentioned hero. This has nothing to do with the principle of charity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984