Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Property: what can be ascribed to an object in order to distinguish it from other objects. In philosophy, there is debate about whether properties exist or whether "bare particulars" exist. Expressions for properties are predicates. Not every predicate will refer to a property. See also quantification over properties, 2nd order logic, HOL, completeness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Stephen Schiffer on Properties - Dictionary of Arguments
I 144 Properties/existence/Schiffer: Names: are (correctly) distinguished from objects - an object is named contingently. Different from that: Properties: are not equally distinguished from the predicate. Otherwise: "Property Realism": predicates as the names of the properties (SchifferVs). >Predicates/Quine, >Properties/Quine, >Schematic letters/Quine. Yet harmless: "something that both believe" Solution: substitutional quantification. >Substitutional quantification, >Intensional Objects, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief. Similar problem: the harmless pleonastic use of "fact". >Facts/Geach. I 145 Physical property and facts/Schiffer: thesis: these are language-dependent. But: Nominalism (Schiffer pro): Properties are not the semantic values of predicates. >Semantic value._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
||
> Counter arguments against Schiffer
> Counter arguments in relation to Properties
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-23