Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Introduction, philosophy: the introduction of objects establishes rules for the use of linguistic expressions for the objects, not a determination or description of these objects. See also definitions, use, language, expressiveness, localization._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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P.F. Strawson on Introduction - Dictionary of Arguments
I 187 Term/expression/thing/introducing/Strawson: everything what is introduced by an expression in an uterance is a thing. Term: StrawsonVsQuine: here also non-linguistical, thing. >Terms. I 188 VsGeach: does not distinguish between the various types of introduction to the speech. - One can say, a statement says something about every thing that is inserted into it, not only about the things that have been introduced in a referring manner - (also on smoking) - "is wise" is purportedly introduced, Socrates is not. >Assertion, >Predicates/Geach, >Predicates/Strawson, >Predication/Geach. I 192 But still no difference between assertive and facts-introductory mode, because the latter is also predicating. I 193 Assertive mode primary. I 194 Introduction: indicative verbal form: introduces thing in a statement - substantive: has no such implication can also introduce lists of things - VsFrege: is determined that terms cannot only be introduced non-substantively - hence the paradox that "is wise" is an object, not a term - (not introduced in the assertive mode). I 196 StrawsonVsFrege: that the parts of the sentence only stick together by unsaturated is merely metaphorical - RamseyVsFrege: no reason to consider any part as unsaturated. >Unsaturated. I 232ff Particular/Introduction: by identifying description - so that speakers and hearers mean the same particular. >Particulars/Strawson. I 234 Introductory description must not specify texture: E.g. the city in which I lived - but true empirical statement. I 235 For universals nothing corresponding. I 236 But no facts about the world but about the language - ((s) no truthmaker.) I 238 When universals are introduced into language, no empirical certainty of truth of sentences needed. I 239 Special case: if universal is not introduced through expression but through description, then confirmation trough empirical sentence necessary. - E.g. instead of "flu": "John's Disease". >Description, >Intension. I 239f Universal/particular/introduction: Class (1): (universal): expressions of which one (without empirical facts) cannot know what they introduce class (2) (paricular) also without empirical fact possible to know what they introduce - both are incomplete (1) presuppose implicit expressions, have factual weight (2) have no factual weight. I 241 Subject/predicate/thing/particular/universal: 3. Criterion: expressions introducing particulars can never be predicate expressions - Definition subject-expression: presents a fact by itself (complete) Predicate A: incomplete "is married to John" is not a fact by itself. I 242 E.g. "generosity is a more amiable virtue than intelligence" - "generosity" and "intelligence" do not present a covert joint fact. I 242 General/individual: the affinity between the grammatical and the categorical criterion for subject/predicate distinction explains also the traditional concatenation of the two distinctions. I 254ff Introduction/particular: so far only quasi as quantification according to an empirical condition. >Quantification. New/Strawson: other sense of introducing: introduction of a practice, to introduce particular in the 1st sense - then also E1: introduces particular, E2: classes of particulars. Then prerequisite2 V2: class of things (or universals) which can be introduced. - Where is then the asymmetry between particular and universal? I 258 Connection of the two theories: an EF1 of a particular of the relevant class, we can think in such a way that it is a fact of the v2 class v1. I 263 Both theories are independend, but connectable. I 259 Particular/Introduction: sentences in which certain types of particulars are introduced, cannot be traced back to those in which they do not occur. E.g. statements about Nations cannot be traced back in statements via people - but they have statements about people as a prerequisite2 Problem: What is at the end of the chain? >Feature-universals._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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> Counter arguments against Strawson
> Counter arguments in relation to Introduction
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18