. Saul A. Kripke on Unicorn Example - Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Unicorn example, philosophy: the problem is about linguistic expressions for non-existent objects and principles of using these expressions. In logic it comes to the question of whether sentences containing expressions for non-existent objects are true, false, or senseless. See also Pegasus, nonexistence, reference, truth value, truth conditions, assertibility, meaning, sense, truth value gap.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Saul A. Kripke on Unicorn Example - Dictionary of Arguments

I 33
We simply cannot say under what circumstances unicorns could exist.
>Existence/Kripke
, >Nonexistence.
I 178
E.g. the discovery (of fossils) does not provide a proof of existence of mythical figures.
I 179
The discovery that there was actually a detective, would not show that Conan Doyle wrote about this man.
>Reference/Kripke, >Meaning (Intending)/Kripke, >Fictions.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-05-30
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