Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Unicorn example, philosophy: the problem is about linguistic expressions for non-existent objects and principles of using these expressions. In logic it comes to the question of whether sentences containing expressions for non-existent objects are true, false, or senseless. See also Pegasus, nonexistence, reference, truth value, truth conditions, assertibility, meaning, sense, truth value gap._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Unicorn Example - Dictionary of Arguments
I 312 Non-Existence/Logical Form: "(Ex) (x = Pegasus)" with Pegasus as a singular term it is wrong - correct: with Pegasus as a general term "= Pegasus" - but "(Ex) (x is Pegasus)" is false (because of existence). I 356f Fallacy of subtraction: just because we can speak of meaning, unicorns and "aspects", it is wrong to assume that there must be some (QuineVs). I 424 Unicorn: object-oriented (falsifying) thinking. Some philosophers: Thesis: "Pegasus" and "unicorn" can indeed be entirely appropriate terms, terms that we understand because their contexts are sufficiently closely linked to sensory irritations or intervening theories without unicorns or pegasus. This difficulty focuses more on singular terms such as "Pegasus" and not so general terms such as "unicorn". Because this is where the gaps in truth values come into play in everyday language. QuineVs: Quine is against any temptation to venture out into the mire of "unrealized possibilities". Pegasus/Quine: singular term. Unicorn/Quine: general term. III 99 Apply: terms apply. Centaur/Unicorn/Quine: "Centaur" applies to every centaur and nothing else, that is, nothing at all, since there are no centaurs. III 254 Meaning/Non-Existence/singular term/Quine: a singular term may or may not denote an object, but in any case it has a meaning. Example "Zerberus". III 256 Unicorn/Meaning/Quine: if the word were without meaning, not only the poets would suffer, one could also not express the simple fact of the non-existence of the cerberus. III 258 Unicorn/round square/name/meaning/singular term/Quine: Conclusion: that something has the task of denoting something (i.e. is significant) does not depend at all on it fulfilling this task. Significant/Quine: at first only: to have the task of denoting something. This is an unsuccessful denotation! In any case, the denotated object is not the meaning of the word. (Confusion of meaning and designated object). III 264 Unicorn/Variable/Quine: Example: "Zerberus guards the gate" is analogous to an open sentence, not to a closed sentence. ((s) Open sentence "x guards the gate." Closed sentence: "The Guardian guards the gate." III 280 Description/singular terms/Quine: since singular terms can always be understood as descriptions, we can also understand "unicorn" as identification. This saves us from differentiating between denotative and non-denotative singular terms. III 281 The dispute becomes a dispute about predicates. III 281 Truth Value/Non-Existence/Unicorn/Quine: it would be premature to say that sentences like "Zerberus barks" are wrong. VI 128 Singular Term/truth value/sense/divalent logic/unicorn/Quine: in the case of unrelated singular terms or failed descriptions, we may not know the truth value. It is not profitable to describe such sentences as pointless, as the existence of the object (e.g. Pluto) could turn out. It is okay to leave the truth value open, but not the meaning of a sentence! II 137 ff Properties as the last classes of all elements of the zero class - so all are the same? - Vs: Identity definition: this applies only to theories that do not let objects belong to any class. >Non-existence._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Unicorn Example
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19