Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Unicorn example, philosophy: the problem is about linguistic expressions for non-existent objects and principles of using these expressions. In logic it comes to the question of whether sentences containing expressions for non-existent objects are true, false, or senseless. See also Pegasus, nonexistence, reference, truth value, truth conditions, assertibility, meaning, sense, truth value gap.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
I 312
Non-Wxistence/Logical Form: "(Ex) (x = Pegasus)" with Pegasus as a singular term it is wrong - correct: with Pegasus as a general term "= Pegasus" - but "(Ex) (x is Pegasus)" is false (because of existence).
I 356f
Fallacy of subtraction: just because we can speak of meaning, unicorns and "aspects", it is wrong to assume that there must be some (QuineVs).
I 424
Unicorn: object-oriented (falsifying) thinking.
Some philosophers: Thesis: "Pegasus" and "unicorn" can indeed be entirely appropriate terms, terms that we understand because their contexts are sufficiently closely linked to sensory irritations or intervening theories without unicorns or pegasus. This difficulty focuses more on singular terms such as "Pegasus" and not so general terms such as "unicorn". Because this is where the gaps in truth values come into play in everyday language.
QuineVs: Quine is against any temptation to venture out into the mire of "unrealized possibilities".
Pegasus/Quine: singular term.
Unicorn/Quine: general term.
III 99
Apply: terms apply.
Centaur/Unicorn/Quine: "Centaur" applies to every centaur and nothing else, that is, nothing at all, since there are no centaurs.
III 254
Meaning/Non-Existence/singular term/Quine: a singular term may or may not denote an object, but in any case it has a meaning. Example "Zerberus".
III 256
Unicorn/Meaning/Quine: if the word were without meaning, not only the poets would suffer, one could also not express the simple fact of the non-existence of the cerberus.
III 258
Unicorn/round square/name/meaning/singular term/Quine: Conclusion: that something has the task of denoting something (i.e. is significant) does not depend at all on it fulfilling this task.
Significant/Quine: at first only: to have the task of denoting something. This is an unsuccessful denotation! In any case, the denotated object is not the meaning of the word. (Confusion of meaning and designated object).
III 264
Unicorn/Variable/Quine: Example: "Zerberus guards the gate" is analogous to an open sentence, not to a closed sentence. ((s) Open sentence "x guards the gate." Closed sentence: "The Guardian guards the gate."
III 280
Description/singular terms/Quine: since singular terms can always be understood as descriptions, we can also understand "unicorn" as identification. This saves us from differentiating between denotative and non-denotative singular terms.
III 281
The dispute becomes a dispute about predicates.
III 281
Truth Value/Non-Existence/Unicorn/Quine: it would be premature to say that sentences like "Zerberus barks" are wrong.
VI 128
Singular Term/truth value/sense/divalent logic/unicorn/Quine: in the case of unrelated singular terms or failed descriptions, we may not know the truth value. It is not profitable to describe such sentences as pointless, as the existence of the object (e.g. Pluto) could turn out.
It is okay to leave the truth value open, but not the meaning of a sentence!
II 137 ff
Properties as the last classes of all elements of the zero class - so all are the same? - Vs: Identity definition: this applies only to theories that do not let objects belong to any class. (> Unicorn-Example).


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-06-26
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