Economics Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Particular, individual thing, philosophy: this is about the problems associated with the introduction of linguistic expressions for objects that can be specified as individuals. See also individuation, objects, thing, identification, specification, singular terms, general term, universals.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Peter F. Strawson on Particulars - Dictionary of Arguments

Graeser I 163
Particulars/Strawson: Particulars have priority in our conceptual system - ability to attribute consciousness to predicates necessary. Condition for them for physical predicates.
, >Physical/psychic, >Introduction/Strawson.
Graeser I 224
Strawson: These particulars take precedence of processes or events that we could not identify without them.
>Identification/Strawson, >Individuation/Strawson.
Newen I 150
VsStrawson/Newen/Schrenk: why should just particulars be the most fundamental reference objects of subject terms and not events? - Strawson: because objects are recognizable after some time - his arguments are transcendental.
Strawson I 35ff
Particular/Strawson: as long as it is isolated from the rest of the knowledge, we can learn nothing new about it.
I 51
Particular/Strawson: is there a class of particular on which all others depend? - Maybe dependent "private particular".
Elementary: Class of People.
Tradition: private particular: "Emotions" fundamental.
I 52
Principium indivduationis/Strawson: is based on identity of persons.
I 70
Particular/Strawson: material bodies: fundamental for the identification - not for process - StrawsonVsRussell: not biography instead of the names.
I 72
Description of particular does not force to mention the process - but identification dependency of processes of the particulars in which they take place - because things require space, processes not always.
>Space/Strawson, cf. >Process-ontology.
I 175
Particular/properties/Strawson: one cannot only refer identifying to particulars - VsTradition: therefore object character is not a criterion for particulars.
I 176
Particular/properties/RamseyVsTradition: from the fact that two things are linked, it does not follow that they must have different characters.
>Reference/Strawson, >Particularization/Ramsey.
1. grammatical criterion for distinguishing between things and activities
2. categorical criterion.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993

Send Link
> Counter arguments against Strawson
> Counter arguments in relation to Particulars

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z