Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Sensation: ability to detect differences between own inner states related to stimuli. Sensations are fundamentally for perceptions and unlike them not linked to linguistic abilities. See also sensory impression, impression, perception, stimulation, stimuli, emotion, experience._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Gilbert Ryle on Sensations - Dictionary of Arguments
I 277 Sensation/Ryle: a sensation cannot only be scratching the surface, not intentionally and not faulty. An examination could be superficial. A feeling is not a trait of reason... I 278 - ...or of a character trait. An animal can have the same sensation as the smartest person. I 279 f It is pointless to observe sensation - there is no confronting of public objects! Sensation is not a perception. There are no motives for sensation. I 325 Sensation/Ryle: sensation is not watching - it cannot be faulty. >Sensory impression, >Other minds/Ryle, >Observation, >Terminology/Ryle, >Perception/Ryle._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
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> Counter arguments against Ryle
> Counter arguments in relation to Sensations
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16