Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Sensation: ability to detect differences between own inner states related to stimuli. Sensations are fundamentally for perceptions and unlike them not linked to linguistic abilities. See also sensory impression, impression, perception, stimulation, stimuli, emotion, experience._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Wilfrid Sellars on Sensations - Dictionary of Arguments
I XIIf Sensation/Sellars: is not passive. >Perception/Sellars, >Appearance/Sellars, >Consciousness/Sellars, >Sensory impressions/Sellars. I 9 Sensation/Sellars: can be acquired through learning (symbols). - Sensation is also factual knowledge. Conclusion (RyleVs) is irrelevant. - Sensation is neither epistemically nor physically. - It is not to be equated with thoughts. >Facts/Sellars, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Thoughts I 46 Sensation/Sellars: sensation is no idea. Learning: is activity. Experience: relates to an object. >Ideas, >Learning, >Experience/Sellars. I 77 Inner episodes: Ryle: Category error. >Terminology/Ryle. SellarsVsRyle: sensations as inner episodes are not an error but with other inner episodes (thoughts) intersubjectively explainable. >Intersubjectivity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
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