|Epistemic/ontological: ontological questions relate to the existence of entities that cause perceptions - epistemic questions reflect their recognizability. The question of a principal recognizability itself is ontological and metaphysical. See also metaphysics, ontology, existence, realism, reality, perception._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Roderick Chisholm on Epistemic/ontologic - Dictionary of Arguments
Epistemic/Evauate/Chisholm: - epistemic terms: E.g. What is reasonable? - Restraint? - E.g. if agnosticism is not more reasonable than theism, then theism is more reasonable.
Epistemic levels - as atheism: hold suspected for something - be acceptable - beyond a reasonable doubt - evident - certainly - (applies to propositions).
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Epistemic terms/Chisholm: basic concept: more reasonable than; acceptable, certainly, evident - SchrammVsChisholm: when objectively reasonable, then independent from the subject, then independent from accepting, even from knowledge, etc. - it must also be possible that the subject act according to what it does not believe - even against evidence! - Solution/Chisholm: self-presentation "factual component": the subject agrees - SchrammVs: Dilemma a) an objective rationality lacks factual components - b) when the subject is consenting the concepts do not obey the epistemic logic - Schramm: always something new is "more reasonable".
Schramm, Alfred. Ein Dilemma für Chisholm „Begriffe der epistemischen Bewertung“. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004