Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Event: A change of state. The event itself has no duration, otherwise the beginning and the end of the event would have to have their own duration or the beginning and the end of an event in turn would be independent events. See also regress, process, flux, change, states._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David K. Lewis on Events - Dictionary of Arguments
V 56 Event/Lewis: can consist of parts, so great violations of laws of nature can be distinguished from small ones by the number of parts of complex events, not by "many laws", because always an infinite number of laws are violated when a single one is trespassed - or only one fundamental law violated. V 166 Event: always correspond to >propositions. - Hence we can use propositions here - e.g. O(e) says that an event e exists (happens), which complies with the description - in a set of possible worlds - But the proposition is not identical to the event - Problem: if no other event than e could fulfil the description, you would need rigid descriptions - which almost never exist - E.g. "Death of Socrates" is non-rigid. Solution: it is not about a sentence F(e), which is true in all and only the worlds in which e happens - Solution: We just need propositions that may have expressions in our language, but not necessarily do - If two events do not occur in exactly the same worlds, this means that there are no absolutely necessary links between the individual events - but then we can have a 1:1 connection between the events and the propositions - counterfactual dependence between events is simply a D between propositions - the counterfactual dependence between propositions corresponds to the causal dependence between events. - Causal dependence/Lewis: we then conclude it from the counterfactual dependence of propositions. - The dependence lies in the truth of counterfactual conditionals. - (> Causality/Hume, >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis. V 196 Definition Event: bigger or smaller classes of possible spatiotemporal regions - more or less connected by similarity. >Similarity/Lewis, >Possible world/Lewis. V 240 Event/Lewis: E.g. no event: rapidly converging mathematical consequence - is no quick entity - name ultimately uninteresting - probability theory; its events are propositions or sometimes properties - a theory that allows an unlimited number of Boolean operations can lead to unreal events. V 243 Definition Event: property of a spacetime region - always contingent - no event occurs in every possible world - an event happens in exactly one (whole) region - E.g. scattered region: sports championships. - E.g. annual event: not an event - an event does not repeat itself - and does not happen in different space-time regions. - The region of the event is the mereological sum of the regions where it happens - to each event corresponds a property of regions - such a property belongs to exactly one region of each possible world where the event happens - Property: is simply a class here. V 245 Event: two events can happen in the same region (space-time region) - E.g. presence of an electron in an electric field can cause its acceleration. It must be possible that one occurs without the other. Even if some of the laws of nature are violated. For every two events, there is a region in a possible world where one occurs, but not the other. ((s) independence) Two events never necessarily occur at the same time - there are hardly any conditions for eventness - maybe: 1) Regions are individuals that are parts of possible worlds 2) No region is part of various possible worlds - similar to > Montague. V 258 Event/mereology/part/partial event/Essence/Lewis: an event can be part of another. - E.g. movement of the left foot is part of walking. Def essential Part/Event: e is an essential part of f iff. f happens in a region, then also e necessarily in a sub-region that is enclosed in the region (implication of an event). But not necessary: events do not necessarily have their spatiotemporal parts. - E.g. walking could consist of fewer steps. V 259 Part/Whole/Event: Writing of "rry"/"Larry": counterfactual dependence, but not cause/Effect. - They are not causally dependent - nevertheless "rry" can be causally dependent on the writing of "La" - but not of "Larr" (overlapping). - The whole is not the cause of its parts. V 260 Event/mereology/Lewis: Thesis: events do not have a simpler mereology that, for example, chairs. A sum of chairs is not itself a chair, but a conference can be a sum of meetings. >Mereology. E.g. War is the mereological sum of battles - Event/Lewis: should serve as cause and effect - partial event: here the causality is sometimes difficult to determine - Problem: whether a subregion can be determined for a partial event in which it occurs - in simple cases yes. V 261 Non-event/Causal story/Lewis: Non-events cannot be determined as something isolated - they cannot be the cause. Constancy: is not always a non-event! Constancies are needed in causal explanation. >Causal explanation/Lewis._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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