Dictionary of Arguments

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Satisfaction, logic: a formula is satisfied when their variables are interpreted in a way that the formula as a whole is a true statement. The interpretation is a substitution of the variables of the formula by appropriate constants (e.g. names). When the interpreted formula is true, we call it a model. See also satisfiability, models, model theory.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
VI 121f
Truth/Satisfaction/Recursion/Tarski/Quine: truth can actually not be defined by satisfaction (level) - Solution: satisfaction itself is not directly but recursively defined - then truth can be defined through satisfaction - because satisfaction of each sentence is delivered, not a rule like "x fulfils y" for variable y - direct definition: leads to rules - Recursion: on individual cases.
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VI 123
Hence truth and satisfaction clearly, but not eliminably defined.
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X 61
Satisfaction/Meta language/Object language/Quine(s): that what satisfies, is part of the meta language, that what is satisfied is part of the object language.
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X 62
Satisfaction/Quine: the n-tuples can contain more elements than the satisfied sentence has variables. The surplus elements are irrelevant - E.g. x conquered y is fulfilled by the n-tuple (sequence) for every a - ((s) i.e. the surplus elements can be any objects!) - If the n-tuple has fewer elements than there are variables in the sentence, then the last element is always repeated.
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X 62
Only closed sentences can be true - but also closed sentences can be satisfied - they are satisfied with any n-tuple (object sequence), because all surplus elements of the sequence (objects) are simply irrelevant - if the sentence contains no variables, all objects are irrelevant - Quine: this applies due to a convention.
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X 63
N-tuples/sequence/satisfaction/(s): the sequences or n-tuples are always sequences of objects, rather than strings - A sentence (even a string) can never be satisfied by a string, only by objects.
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X 63
Satisfaction/alphabetical order/Quine: is important because of conjunction - E.g. satisfies both "x conquered y" and "z killed x".
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X64
Satisfaction/Existential quantification/Quine/(s): existential quantification creates sentences where not all variables must be bound. Deviation at most at i-th point: the point that may deviate is just the point of the bound variable! - E.g. (Ey)(x conquered y) is fulfilled with or every sequence for an arbitrary y - So: a closed sentence is satisfied by any sequence, an open one only if it becomes true by satisfaction - Assuming satisfaction by too long n-tuples: e.g. existential quantification Ey(x conquered y) is filled with Caesar, i.e. by - as well as any extension of - open sentence: E.g. "x conquered y" is fulfilled by any extension of .
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X 68
Satisfaction definition/Quine: must contain object language and meta language. - ((s) Perhaps applies always for the formulation of a conditions?).
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X 72
Satisfaction/Sequences/Object sequences/General/Particular/Compound/Compound sentences/Quine: Problem: you could know of an n-tuple which simple sentences it fulfils and yet you cannot decide whether it satisfies a particular compound sentence. - E.g. one could know which simple sentences an n-tuple satisfies, but not if it fulfils a quantification "Ez Fxyz" - because that depends on whether at least one element w requires: fulfils "Fxyz".


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-03-22
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