Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Essentialism: the view that objects have some of their properties necessarily. See also essence, necessity de re, necessity, contingency, properties, actualism, possible worlds.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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Robert Stalnaker on Essentialism - Dictionary of Arguments

I 71
Essentialism/today/VsQuine: most modal logicians today accept essentialism. QuineVsEssentialism: incorrect: it is incorrect to say that one description is better than the other, because it better characterizes essential properties of an object.
I 72
Essence/essentialism/essential property/LeibnizVsQuine/Stalnaker: thesis: every property of every individual constitutes its essence and only the existence of the thing as a whole is contingent.
I 74
Anti-Essentialism/quantified modal logic/Stalnaker/conclusion: in order to connect the two, we need real semantic conditions for atomic predicates. Reason: (Ex)N(Fx) > (x)N(Fx) is a theorem, but not its substitution instance (Ex)N(Rxy) > (x)N(Rxy). If something necessarily is father of x, then everything is necessarily father of x. Of course, only intrinsic predicates are in question, but this is assumed and not explained.
I 85
Essentialism/Stalnaker: questions about essentialism are questions about how far it is appropriate and possible to abstract.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-08-03
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