Colin McGinn on Evolution - Dictionary of Arguments
Human/Evolution/mind/McGinn: it is a remarkable coincidence that we are the only species on earth that is able to do science and philosophy. There could easily be a different species with a certain level of scientific talent, about the level of a ten year old. Or a species that is superior in biology but inferior in physics etc.
The kind of intelligence that we have, is absolutely not necessary for living beings to survive.
Consciousness/evolution/McGinn: consciousness is not the pinnacle of evolution and also not the most impressive part of organism structures. It is biologically, comparatively simple. It is part of our oldest facilities. (Not self-confidence!).
Consciousness is as common as blood and bone: Even octopus need consciousness for the interpretation of what they perceive with their eyes.
Consciousness is not a product of culture or civilization. (Self-esteem might be).
The problem with consciousness results from our way of thinking, not from the consciousness itself.
Mind/consciousness/evolution/McGinn: evolution does not explain consciousness, nor sensation.
Reason: sensation and consciousness cannot be explained with the means of the Darwinian principles and physics, because if the selection will explain how sensations are caused by it, it must be possible to shape the mind of matter. ((s) consciousness or sensation must be visible for selection. (Similarly GouldVsDawkins))_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001