Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Existence, philosophy, logic: the fact that there is something to which properties can be attributed. That does not mean that something has to be given immediately or can be perceived by the senses. See also ontology, properties, predicates, existence statements, realism, quantification, ascription._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D. Lewis on Existence - Dictionary of Arguments
Schwarz I 30 Existence Definition/Lewis : is simply to be one of the things that are there. >"there are"/existence. - - - Lewis IV 24 Actual/actuality/ontology/existence/"there is"//Lewis: Thesis: There are many things that are not actual - e.g. overcountable many people, spread over many possible worlds. - LewisVsCommon sense: not everything is actual. - >Difference between "exist"/"there is". >Actuality/Lewis. IV 40 Existence/Ontology/Possible Worlds/Lewis: let's say an individual exists from the point of view of a world when, and only when, it is the least restricted area normally capable of determining the WW in the world. (This is not about modal metaphysics). Cf. >Modal realism, >Metaphysical possibility/Lewis. This area will include all individuals in the world, not others. And some, but not all, sets (e.g. numbers). - - - Schwarz I 20 Quantification/range/Schwarz: Unlimited quantifiers are rare and belong to metaphysics. Example "There is no God" refers to the whole universe. Example "There is no beer": refers to the refrigerator. Existence/Lewis/Schwarz: then there are different "modes of existence". Numbers exist in a different way than tables. Existence/Presentism: his statements about what exists are absolutely unlimited. Four-dimensionalism/existence: statements about what exists ignore past and future from his point of view. Cf. >Four dimensionalism. Schwarz I 30 Existence/Van Inwagen: (1990b(1). Chapter 19) Thesis: Some things are borderline cases of existence. LewisVsvan Inwagen: (1991(2),80f,1986e(3),212f): if you have already said "there is", then the game is already lost: if you say "something exists to a lesser degree". Def Existence/Lewis: simply means to be one of the things that exist. Schwarz I 42 Def Coexistence/Lewis: two things are in the same world, iff there is a space-time path from one to the other. Consequence: Possible worlds/Lewis: are space-time isolated! So there is also no causality between them. >counterparts, >counterpart relation, >counterpart theory. Schwarz I 232 Object/existence/ontology/Lewis/Schwarz: the question whether a thing exists in a world is itself completely determined by the distribution of qualitative properties and relations. Then the condition "what things exist there" is superfluous. With this we are with Lewis' "a priori reductionism of everything". (1994b(4),291). Truthmaker/Lewis: Pattern of the instantiation of fundamental properties and relations. >Truth maker/Lewis. 1. P. van Inwagen [1990b]: Material Beings. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press 2. D. Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell 3. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. D. Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19