Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Extension, philosophy: an object, for example, the planet Venus as a material body, independent from the manner in which it is singled out. In contrast, intension is the way in which the object is given or is represented, e.g. Morning star or Evening star. See also intensions, identity, identity conditions, reference, meaning, assertibility conditions, propositional attitudes, opacity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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P. Geach on Extensions - Dictionary of Arguments
I 231f Extension/Geach: E.g. to accept sense data as a more fundamental class of objects: If we know what sense data are, we can consider the extension of a predicate that is true only of sense data as identical to a particular physical object. >Sense data. But this does not reduce the object itself to a logical construction. - ... + ... If there is an object like the range of z for which F(z), then x belongs to this range only if F(x). I 235 Extension/Geach: it is a serious mistake to assume the objects formed the extension, they are only indirectly assigned to it as falling under the concept. I 243 Theory/extensional/Geach: no theory, no matter how rich, may contain all classes which are the extensions of their own sentences. >Semantic paradoxes. Cf. >Extensionality._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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> Counter arguments against Geach
> Counter arguments in relation to Extensions
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19