Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Colours: in philosophy, the problem of coulour is, among other things, the question of how individual sensory impressions can be generalized or objectified. See also qualities, qualia, perception, inverted spectra, private language._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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W.V.O. Quine on Colour - Dictionary of Arguments
I 85 Color/Quine: colors are more vague than rabbits. In order to determine whether someone is a bachelor you need additional information. The stimulus meaning is not decisive here. There is a rising line from stimulus meaning to additional information: colors - rabbit - bachelor. ((s)> Knowledge/Quine). I 386 Disposition Terms/Quine: are assumptions from fine structure (microstructure). The color: "red" is actually also a disposition term. Irreducible general terms are only paraphrasable through subjunctive conditionals (counterfactual conditionals). >Counterfactual Conditionals/Quine. II 120 ff Colors/Smart: color differences are rarely associated with significant physical differences. Aliens probably have concepts for length and electric charge, but not for color. To see the world correctly we must avoid colors and secondary qualities. V 104 Color/Quine: is not a concept: because it is nothing definite like square and not a particular color. Instead there is the concept of a color word - i.e. "'Red' is a color word" (is language-specific). A bad way to phrase it is: "Red is a color". Because, for example, red and blue are as different as people whose phone number is a prime number. ((s) There is no designating property here. What are red and blue to have in common?) Ostension: Problem: Color is everywhere - therefore "There is color" is a bad observation sentence. Color similarity: always refers to exact similarity. Color Word/Color/General Term/Singular Term/Reference/Language Learning/Language Acquisition/Quine: E.g. you can call snow white and blood red without "white" and "red" being general terms. Snow is a diffuse part of the world which is part of a comprehensive diffuse part of the world, the White. Similar: Example a) smiling mom, b) mom in general. N.B.: against: E.g. the fact that Fido is a dog does not lead to it being part of that broader part of the world which consists of dogs, because that would also apply to his ear. - (>Gavagai) - accordingly for square._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |