Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Fiction: a counterfactual assumption or history. In philosophy, it is the question how a truth value can be attributed to fictional statements. See also idealization, as if, truth, facts, counterfactuals, theories, theoretical entities, existence, ontology._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D. Lewis on Fictions - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 261 Fiction/Truth/Lewis: (Meinongian view) E.g. one can indeed say that Holmes and Nixon belong to the same category: humans. - Unlike E.g. intelligences from steam - E.g. collection: E.g. assuming a large choir in a story: we should not say that its members do not exist because we cannot specify their number - and that is because we can already say something true about the choir. IV 265 Truth/Fiction/Lewis: E.g. Holmes stories would be true in a possible world, where the corresponding things occur - difficult problem: Holmes and Watson could be reversed! - Problem: capturing the "plot" of a Holmes story (in order to exclude the irrelevant) - Kripke: if by chance in the actual world someone was like Holmes, "Holmes" would still not refer to this person. IV 265 Fiction/Lewis: not abstract number of sentences, but rather the act of narration - different on different occasions - could simultaneously bring 2 different fictions: a) harmless for children - b) explosive for the initiated - the possible world that we should look at is the one in which the story is told, but as a known fact rather than fiction -> E.g. Pierre Menard, Author of the Don Quixote: not copied, but told again. IV 267 Fiction/Name/Lewis: The way the name is used in fiction, it is not rigid - it depends more on the designation. IV 269 Truth/Fiction/Lewis: read as >counterfactual conditionals. Def truth in fiction: thesis: an unreal conditional clause (counterfactual conditional) of the form "if f, then it would be the case that y" is non-trivially true if a possible world, in which both are true, differs less from our real world than any possible world in which f is true and y is not true. (The rear part is not true) - ((s)> similarity metrics) - ((s) actual world as third, as a reference point for measuring similarity between possible worlds) - absurd question: what blood type was Holmes? - Solution: bundle of possible worlds - "the worlds of Holmes" - it all depends on which possible world is our real world. IV 272 Truth in fiction: should not depend on our assumptions about the background, otherwise this truth would be constantly changing - Solution: the crucial background is the one shared by the community at the time when the fiction arose._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19