Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Foundation: Foundation in logic and philosophy of science is the idea that assertions must ultimately be based in empiricism. Even in formalized statements, it must ultimately be possible to specify the meaning of the components or expressions by reference to something in the world. See also Formalism, Formalization, Logic, Everyday language, Meaning, Reference._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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P. Simons on Foundation - Dictionary of Arguments
I 340 Foundation/SimonsVsFine: a foundation cannot be made up of individuals of the same category. Better: R-families. These normally include continuants and events (problem: then again no sum can be formed). >Continuants, >Events. Generic dependency: often, only something vague is required: e.g. any oxygen molecules. >Dependence. I 342 Foundation/Husserl: the foundation explains best what the whole complex holds together. Connection/Husserl: a conncection is ultimately purely formal. If objects cannot exist without each other, it is pointless to look for a chain. >E. Husserl._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Simons
> Counter arguments in relation to Foundation
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-23