Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Functions: I. A function in mathematics is a relation between a set of inputs and a set of outputs, where each input is related to exactly one output. The set of inputs is called the domain of the function. Functions can be represented by formulas, graphs, or tables. For example, the function f(x) = x^2 is represented by the formula y = x^2, which takes any number as input and returns its square as output. The graph of this function is a parabola.
II. In psychology, functions refer to the various mental processes and behaviors that enable individuals to adapt and interact effectively with their environment. These include cognitive functions like perception, memory, and reasoning, as well as emotional and social functions like regulating emotions, forming relationships, and making decisions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D.M. Armstrong on Functions - Dictionary of Arguments
Place III 119 Function/Place/(s): There is no double function: a thing cannot at the same have the categorical property (as a function) of sharpness and the dispositional property (as a function) of the ability to cut. - ((s) At least no "double explanation" no "double yield"?). Example: if the arrangement of the molecules of opium contitutes the categorical aspect of the binding of these atoms, it can not simultaneously have the categorical aspect of the soporific effect. - There does not seem to enough categorical to supply all reactants with their dispositional property. >Dispositions/Place._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18