Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Way of givenness, manner of presentation, philosophy: expression from G. Frege for distinguishing meaning (in Frege's sense of meaning that upon which a term refers - today "reference") and the sense (in Frege's use of the term, what we today call "meaning"). The givenness depends both on the circumstances and the individual language use. Carnap introduces the concept of "intension" for the way of givenness. See also intensions, extensions, propositions, propositional attitudes, improper speech, proper speech, improper sense, proper sense, meaning, reference._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Edmund Husserl on Way of Givenness - Dictionary of Arguments
Gadamer I 248 Way of Givenness/Husserl/Gadamer: According to Husserl's own statement(1) it was the a priori-correlation of experience and ways of givenness, which dominated his whole life-work since the logical investigations. Already in the fifth logical investigation he had worked out the peculiarity of intentional experiences and distinguished consciousness - as he made it a research topic, "as an intentional experience"(...) - from the real unit of consciousness of experiences and from their inner perception. >Experience/Husserl, >Consciousness/Husserl, >Introspection. Gadamer I 249 Validity of being now also possesses human subjectivity [in Husserl's phenomenology]. It is therefore to be regarded just as much, i.e. it too is to be explored in the diversity of its modes of existence. Such an exploration of the ego as a phenomenon is not "inner perception" of a real ego, but it is also not a mere reconstruction of the i.e. relationship of the contents of consciousness to a transcendental ego pole (Natorp)(2) but is a highly differentiated topic of transcendental reflection. Way of Givenness: This reflection represents the growth of a new dimension of research compared to the mere fact of phenomena of objective consciousness, a fact in intentional experiences. For there is also a given fact that is not itself the object of intentional acts. Every experience has implied horizons of the before and after and finally merges with the continuum of the before and after present experiences to form the unity of the stream of experience. >Time/Husserl, >Time-consciousness/Husserl. 1. Husserliana VI. 169. 2. Natorp, Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode, 1888; Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode, 1912._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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> Counter arguments against Husserl
> Counter arguments in relation to Way of Givenness
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20