Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Object: The object in philosophy is anything that can be thought about or talked about. It can be concrete or abstract, and it is often contrasted with the subject, which is the being that is doing the thinking or talking. See also Subject, Subject-Object Problem, Objects (Material things)._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Object - Dictionary of Arguments
I 102 Goodman: "Rabbitness": is a discontinuous space-time segment, which consists of rabbits. --- I 372f Objects of propositional attitude eliminated: "Thomas believes (Cicero has): no longer the form" Fab" a = Thomas, b = () - but: "Fa" where "F" is a complex expression - no longer "believes" term, but operator. I 402 Existence: does not arise from dichotomy "single thing" - "universal" - it does not matter whether they do exist. "Equator", "North Pole" - linking with stimuli is weak argument for primacy of physical objects, but makes terms accessible for all positions. >Existence/Quine. I 412 Object: name which is denoted by singular terms, accepts it as values - (but the singular term is eliminated!) - E.g. "glimmer", but not "glimmeriness". I 438 Ideal objects are not permitted - geometric objects are permitted (no identity without localization). I 435 Relativity: additional dimension: space-time: point moments are absolutely different, independent of relative movement of the viewpoint. II 30 Object/Quine: space-time piece can also be distributed or scattered. (Nominalism, Goodman). II 23 Physical object is deceptive - better space-time pieces - "space" and "places as such" untenable, otherwise there would be absolute standstill and absolute movement - 4-digit coordinates suffice - ontology of pure set theory - no more physical object. II 156 ff Object (physical)/Quine: arbitrarily scattered and arbitrarily singled out - pocket contents, single coin at various points in time, combination with the Eiffel Tower, space-time points, anything - are not so strongly body-oriented - identification like from one possible world to another: without content as long as no instructions are given - value of a variable. VI 32 Object/Ontology/Quine: bodies constitute themselves as ideal nodes in the centers of overlapping observation sentences - problem: observation sentences are not permanent - therefore the objectification (reification) is always already a theory. VI 34 Question: what should be considered real objectification and not just a theoretically useful one (like classes). VI 35 Abstract objects: it is pointless to speak of permanent stimulus phases - solution: pronouns and bound variables - Vs singular term: are often not referring - there must be unspecifiable irrational numbers - Solution: bound variable instead of singular term. VI 38f Objectification/Reification/Quine: for the first time in predicative connection of observation sentences - instead of their mere conjunction - "This is a blue pebble": calls for embedding pebble into the blue. VI 41 Abstract objects/Modal/Putnam/Parsons: modal operators can save abstract objects - QuineVsModal logic: instead quantification (postulation of objects) - so we can take the slack out of the truth function. >Modal Logic/Quine. VII (d) 69 Object/Quine: may be unconnected: E.g. USA Alaska. XII 36 Properties/Identity/Quine: Problem: (unlike objects) they are ultimately based on synonymy within a language - more language-specific identity. >Properties/Quine. V 39 Ultimately we do without rigorous individuation of properties and propositions. (different term scheme) - Frege dito: (Basic Laws): do not extend identity to terms. XII 68 Object/Theory/Quine: what is an object, ultimately, cannot be stated - only in terms of a theory - (ultimately overall theory, i.e. language use) - but wrong: to say that talk about things would only make sense within a wider range - that would correspond to the false thesis that no predicate applied to all things - there are universal predicates. >Mention, >use, >word, >object._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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