Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Object: The object in philosophy is anything that can be thought about or talked about. It can be concrete or abstract, and it is often contrasted with the subject, which is the being that is doing the thinking or talking. See also Subject, Subject-Object Problem, Objects (Material things)._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ludwig Wittgenstein on Object - Dictionary of Arguments
Dummett I 34 Object/Wittgenstein: assumes that we only recognize an object, if we are able to think a thought about this object. Dummett I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. >">Private language. --- Hintikka I 51 Object/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: one of the widespread misconceptions about the Tractatus includes the notion that what he calls "objects" does not includes any relations and properties. - Wittgenstein verbally: "to the objects also belong the relations". >Relations. I 55 Indestructibility of objects/Hintikka: - ""Red" cannot be destroyed." I 57 Individuals: Relationships with zero argument places (Tractatus 5.554). >Individuals. I 85 Object/name/language/Socrates/Theaetetus/Hintikka: for the original elements of which everything is composed, there is no explanation - Everything that is, can only be described by names, another provision is not possible - neither it is nor that it is not - so the language is an interweaving of names. I 99 Object/property/possession/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: E.g. possession is not essential for an object - not even for E.g. my hand - not even for my visual space. It is only subjectively perceived - because the objective space is constructed on its base. - ((s)> extrinsic property). - (PB VII 71, 99f) - so it may be useful to give a hand during repeated use a name. >Names. I 106 Object/acquaintance/Fraud/error/Russell/Moore/Hintikka: thesis: because one can be fooled, the objects of acquaintance are not the same as the physical objects - ("Illusion Argument"). >Acquaintance. I 181 Object/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: even the simplest objects Wittgenstein's are structured. - ((s) (see above) They have a logical form, formed by their possible occurrences in states of affairs.) >States of affairs. I 223 Object/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: (average period): improper items: color spots in the visual field, tones etc. - actual objects: elements of knowledge. >Knowledge._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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> Counter arguments against Wittgenstein
> Counter arguments in relation to Object
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19