Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Counterpart: in the philosophy of David K. Lewis a counterpart is an object in a possible world, which corresponds to an object in our world - the actual world. For David Lewis no object is in more than one world. Therefore, he must accept counterparts. The counterparts may correspond exactly to the objects in our actual world or deviate more or less strongly from them. See also counterpart theory, counterpart relation, possible worlds, modal realism, actualism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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S.A. Kripke on Counterparts - Dictionary of Arguments
I Kripke passim Counterparts (Lewis) are qualitatively determined. KripkeVs: possible worlds are not qualitatively determined, but fixed (such as counterfactual, they cannot be explored). >Possible world/Kripke, >Possible world/Lewis, >Identity across worlds, >Centered world, >Acessibility/Kripke. _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 |
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> Counter arguments against Kripke
> Counter arguments in relation to Counterparts
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19