Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Counterpart theory: in the philosophy of David K. Lewis a counterpart is an object in a possible world, which corresponds to an object in our world - the actual world. For David Lewis no object is in more than one world. Therefore, he must accept counterparts. The counterparts may correspond exactly to the objects in our actual world or deviate more or less strongly from them. See also counterparts, counterpart relation, possible worlds, modal realism, actualism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David%20K. Lewis on Counterpart%20Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 26f Counterpart theory/Lewis: alternative to modal logic with modal operators - then we have no non-eliminable singular term. IV 27 Four basic predicates: Wx (x is a possible world) - ((s)> quantity) Ixy (x is inside the poossible world y) - ((s)> containment, element relation) Ax (x is actual) - ((s)> existence) Cxy (x is a counterpart of y) - ((s)> correspondence, bearer of possibilities, >cross world identity) Eight postulates/logical form: P1: (x)(y)(Ixy>Wy) - everyday language translation: (Nothing is in something other than a world) - P2: (x)(y)(z)(Ixy & Ixz. > y = z) - (Nothing is in two worlds) P3: (x)(y)(Cxy > E zIxz) - (whatever is a counterpart, is always in a world) P4: (x)(y)(Cxy> E zlyz)- (Whatever has a counterpart, is in a world) P5: (x)(y)(z)(Ixy&Izy&Cxz. > x = z) - (Nothing is a counterpart of something in the same world) P6: (x)(y)(Ixy>Cxx) - (Every thing in a world is a counterpart of itself) P7: (Ex)(Wx&(y)(Iyx ↔ (Ay)) - (A World contains all and only actual things) P8: ExAx - (Something s actual) - The world mentioned in P7 is unique because of P2 and P8 World/logical form/Actual world/Lewis: - @ = def ix(y)(Iyx ↔ Ay) (the actual world). IV 28 Counterpart relation: is generally not an equivalence relation - i.e. It does not apply between the pairs with the same first term (as Carnap would say. Lewis: no thing is in several worlds) - no matter how you tried to identify them - it is not transitive either, because similarity is not transitive - it is not symmetrical either: E.g. assuming x3 in w3 is a mixture of you and your brother and resembles you more than anything else in w3, so x3 is your counterpart. IV 29 But assuming the similarity of x3 with your brother is much greater, then you are not the counterpart IV 42 Counterpart theory/CPT/Lewis: we need counterpart relations in order to be able to determine the essence of something - Problem CPR are not very secured - problem:> similarity. IV 44f Counterpart theory/Lewis: Problem: e.g. two pairs of twins in different possible worlds - they are more similar to the two than any other thing - Question: (double de-re) could the first twins not have lived on two different planets as relatives? - simply de re: Originally the two could simply not have be related (in the same world)? - If that is counterintuitive depends on how the question is asked - Lewis: Double de-re questions should be avoided - they result in duplicate counterpart relations - pairs of counterparts should not be construed as counterparts of pairs. ((s)> Bizet/Verdi: The example is intended to prove that there is no measure for the similarity of worlds. In which world are Bizet and Verdi compatriots? ). IV 54 Referentially transparent/De re/Modal/Normal CPT/Lewis: in my CPT all modal de re predications are referentially transparent - i.e. something has the same counterparts, no matter how we refer to them. --- V 20 Counterpart theory/Lewis: from it follows that the real imperator is not free to cross the Rubicon or not - only his counterpart could refrain - counterpart relations (CPR) and proximity to possible worlds are equally a matter of similarity, but they are independent of one another._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Counterpart Theory
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20