Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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I 146f
Even if we have an idea of ​​the neural equivalents of decisions, it does not provide us with a theory of the nature of the decision.
The generation of decisions is something completely different from the generation of motion. Because decisions are neither put together by antecedent desires or other settings, nor by brain states.
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I 222
Brain/McGinn: It is now commonplace to interpret the brain as an information system (>Information Processing/Dennett) in whose interior most messages remain without a conscious counterpart. Many only concern the inner realities of the brain itself.
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I 223
Thesis: There has to be a silent internal theory of the brain, by the way also for the other organs. A theory which relates to the operation of the whole apparatus.
Neural signals can only be interpreted when they are embedded in a representation of the brain and body functions.
The brain must be a brain researcher, but unconsciously. It must contain a theory of itself.
There must be some real property that distinguishes brains from other objects.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-05-29
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