Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Law statements: Law statements must make only generalizations over single time-limited individuals. See also Laws, Natural laws, Statements, Generalization, Generality, Validity. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David M. Armstrong on Law Statements - Dictionary of Arguments
Place IV 157 Law statement/PlaceVsArmstrong: Goodman (Goodman Facts, Fiction, Forecast, German, p 39): Law statement must make only generalizations over single time-limited individuals - these are laws on the temporal nature of an object, then you need no natural law as a truth maker - only interaction of a reciprocal dispositional property - reciprocal: only our language forces us to attribute the suitability to one side - causal laws are then universally quantified over individuals. PlaceVsUniversals. Cf. >Laws/Goodman. 1. N. Goodman (1988). Tatsache, Fiktion, Voraussage, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. p.39._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
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> Counter arguments against Armstrong
> Counter arguments in relation to Law Statements
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20