Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Objects of belief, philosophy: it is advocated by some authors that beliefs or thoughts must correspond to objects. Other authors see this as the risk of an objectification or reification. When several speakers refer on their intensional object there is the problem of whether it is the same or not. E.g., Do they have the same wish?
See also relation-theory, truthmakers, mentalism, reification._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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David K. Lewis on Objects of Belief - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 134 Objects of belief/Lewis: we should attribute properties instead propositions as objects of belief - they work in more cases - Proposition: set of possible worlds - i.e. a region in the logical space - in contrast properties: set of individuals. --- IV 138 Attitudes/Belief/Objects of belief/Relation theory/Lewis: instead of propositions as objects of belief: - self-attribution of properties - e.g. spatial (not logical) localization: is not a proposition: E.g. I am on the 6th floor of the Stanford library - is not a property that corresponds to a proposition - E.g. >Lingens lost his memory and has to identify himself as a member of a sub-population, whose boundaries do not coincide with the boundaries of possible worlds - with the sub-population whose sole member he is himself - propositional knowledge/Lewis: knowledge of perception: I perceive does not correspond to any proposition - reason: there are possible worlds in which someone has this perception situation and someone else ((s)the same time) does not. --- IV 139 Self-attribution of a property: is >de se, not >de dicto._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |