Dictionary of Arguments

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Limits, philosophy: here we are concerned with the classification of knowledge domains or the identification of possibilities for thought. We need to determine what belongs to a domain and what does not. Problems arise wherever something is to be described beyond an area by the means of this area itself ('impracticability', 'unthinkability','inconceivability'), as well as where an area is solely covered by means originating from this area itself ( Circularity).

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
I 51
World/reality/thought/McDowell: the world does not depend on our thinking, but it is also not beyond the boundary that encloses the conceptual sphere.
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I 54
Ostension/McDowell: that to which we finally come across is still a conceivable content, and not something that would be fundamental, a given piece.
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I 64
Ostension breaks no limits.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell,


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> Counter arguments against McDowell

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-04-25
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