Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Gottlob Frege on Identity - Dictionary of Arguments
Frege II 65 Identity/Frege: e.g. a = b: the meaning of "a" is the same as that of "b". But the sense of "b" is different from that of "a". >judgment, >epistemological value, >non-trivial identity. - - - Dummett III 70f Identity/VsFrege/Dummett: (informative/uninformative) example a = b: some: in order to understand this, you need to know: if it is true - that it is true. Important argument: then it does not provide information. FregeVs: there is no need to know if two expressions designate the same object if you understand the expressions. ((s) You can also know the "general" reference.) - ((s) The intentions may just be different.) >Way of givenness, >Intension. - - - Frege II 40 Identity/statement/assertion of identity/identity statement/Frege: E.g. a = b: does not say anything about signs, but about objects. Otherwise, no insight would be expressed by this, because signs are arbitrary anyway. So it is not about "a" and "b" meaning the same thing. That would be a statement about signs. ((s) Instead: that they are different modes of givenness of the same object (the manner of givenness/(s): is not the sign). II 65 Identity/Frege: a = b: the meaning of "a" is the same as that of "b". But the sense of "b" is different from that of "a". Identity/Frege: identity has the same meaning but a different sense. Notion: therefore, the thought expressed by "a = a" is different from that expressed by "a = b". >Thoughts, >Equal sign, >Copula._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16